The Topology of Conflict and Co-operation

The class of simultaneous 2x2 pure-strategy ordinal games (which include well-known games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and Stag Hunt) have received considerable attention, including complete classification schemes by amongst others Rapoport & Guyer (1978) and Robinson & Goforth (2005). This paper focuses on a particularly pertinent subset of these games, described as the ‘Co-operate-Defect’ (C-D) games, which are characterised by each player having a dominant preference for a particular strategy by the other player. These games are therefore relevant in a number of contexts, including arms race games and collective action problems. The C-D games may be efficiently classified by assigning each player one of six distinct types, a classification that cannot be naturally extended to the full class of 2x2 games. The six types and the resulting game forms are analysed, and the subclass of CD games are identified within a topological structure for the 2x2 games devised by Robinson & Goforth (2005).Conflict; co-operation; game theory; co-operate-defect games

Military Expenditure and Debt in South America

The debt crisis that struck South American countries in the 1980s led to severe recession, and chronic economic problems. This paper considers one potentially important contributor to the growth of external debt, namely military spending. It considers the experience of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It finds was no evidence that military burden had any impact on the evolution of debt in Argentina and Brazil, but some evidence that military burden tended to increase debt in Chile. At the same time Chile was the least affected of the three countries by acute financial crises resulting from the debt problems, although their relative levels of debt were as high or higher. This suggests that military burden may be important in determining debt in countries, but it is only of significance when it is not swamped by other macroeconomic and international factors.Military spending; external debt; South America.

Determining Military Expenditures: Arms Races and Spill-Over Effects in Cross-Section and Panel Data

This paper considers the determinants of military spending, building on an emerging literature that estimates military expenditure demand functions in cross-section and panel data, incorporating ‘arms-race’ type effects. It updates Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b) using the SIPRI military expenditure database for the period 1988-2003, finding broadly similar results. It also shows differences in results across panel methods, particularly the within and between estimates and illustrates the importance of recognising and modelling dynamic processes within panel data. Heterogeneity is also found to be an important issue and when countries are broken up into groups on the basis of per capita income there is no obvious systematic pattern in the results. This is seen to imply that the demand for military spending, even between two mutually hostile powers, may depend on the whole nature of the relationship between them (and other countries and events in the region), and not simply Richardsonian action-reaction patterns.Military Spending; Demand; Arms races; Spillovers; Panel data

Determining Military Expenditures: Arms Races and Spill-Over Effects in Cross-Section and Panel Data

This paper considers the determinants of military spending, building on an emerging literature that estimates military expenditure demand functions in cross-section and panel data, incorporating ‘arms-race’ type effects. It updates Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b) using the SIPRI military expenditure database for the period 1988-2003, finding broadly similar results. It also shows differences in results across panel methods, particularly the within and between estimates and illustrates the importance of recognising and modelling dynamic processes within panel data. Heterogeneity is also found to be an important issue and when countries are broken up into groups on the basis of per capita income there is no obvious systematic pattern in the results. This is seen to imply that the demand for military spending, even between two mutually hostile powers, may depend on the whole nature of the relationship between them (and other countries and events in the region), and not simply Richardsonian action-reaction patterns.Military Spending; Demand; Arms races; Spillovers; Panel data

Determining military expenditures: Arms races and spill-over effects in cross-section and panel data

This paper considers the determinants of military spending, building on an emerging literature that estimates military expenditure demand functions in cross-section and panel data, incorporating ‘arms-race’ type effects. It updates Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b) using the SIPRI military expenditure database for the period 1988-2003, finding broadly similar results. It also shows differences in results across panel methods, particularly the within and between estimates and illustrates the importance of recognising and modelling dynamic processes within panel data.Heterogeneity is also found to be an important issue and when countries are broken up into groups on the basis of per capita income there is no obvious systematic pattern in the results. This is seen to imply that the demand for military spending, even between two mutually hostile powers,may depend on the whole nature of the relationship between them (and other countries and events in the region), and not simply Richardsonian action-reaction patterns

Arms transfers to the Middle East

Sam Perlo-Freema

Symposium: Palestine — an economy in conflict. An introduction to the symposium

Provides an introduction to the symposium on PalestinePeace, security, Palestine, Middle East

The Demand for Military Spending in Developing Countries

Numerous studies have estimated demand for military expenditure in terms of economic, political and strategic variables. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, this paper attempts to ascertain if the new strategic environment has changed the pattern of determinants, by estimating cross-country demand functions for developing countries for periods during and just after the Cold War. The results suggest that, for both periods, military burden depended on neighbours' military spending and internal and external conflict. Democracy and population both relate negatively to military burden. There is little evidence of a change in the underlying relationship between the periods.